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Abstract: 
Elementary economic models are often used to suggest that immigration depresses the wages of native-born 
workers.  These models assume that when immigrants enter a labour market, all other features of that market remain 
unchanged.  Such an assumption is almost never valid.  Here we explore the economic impacts of immigrants during 
America’s Age of Mass Migration a century ago.  This was a period of dynamic structural change that witnessed the 
appearance of new industries, adoption of new technologies, discovery of new mineral resources, the rise of big 
business, and the geographic concentration of industries.  We show that immigrants – and residents – selected 
destinations where labour demand and wages were rising.  Thus, native workers experienced wage increases in the 
presence of heavy immigration.  Models that abstract from the special characteristics of labour markets that attract 
immigrants misrepresent their economic impact. 
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Influential voices in the media and in public policy circles have sustained the impression and 
perhaps heightened the concern that high levels of immigration harm resident Americans by 
reducing their wages.  This perception of “labour market flooding” – sometimes billed as 
“common sense” (Brimelow, 1995) – is bolstered by the logic of introductory-level 
microeconomic theory.  That analysis begins by assuming a downward-sloping demand curve for 
labour in a static labour market.  Under such circumstances, an immigration-induced outward 
shift in the labour supply curve will cause the equilibrium wage to fall.  George Borjas 
emphasized this logic in the title of a recent paper, “The Labor Demand Curve Is Downward 
Sloping” (Borjas, 2003). 
Nonetheless, an impressive number of empirical studies based on recent data find no 
evidence of a negative impact of immigration on resident wages.  At the conclusion of a survey 
of the literature published in 1995, Rachel M. Friedberg and Jennifer Hunt report: 
Despite the popular belief that immigrants have a large adverse impact on the 
wages and employment opportunities of the native-born population, the literature 
on this question does not provide much support for this conclusion.  … 
[E]mpirical estimates in a variety of settings and using a variety of approaches 
have shown that the effect of immigration on the labor market outcomes of 
natives is small.  There is no evidence of economically significant reductions in 
native employment.  Most empirical analysis of the United States and other 
countries finds that a 10 percent increase in the fraction of immigrants in the 




Yet immigration’s impact on wages is extremely difficult to measure.   This is one reason why 
the debate continues.  Several well-known economists, with Borjas prominent among them, 
continue to defend the logic of the textbook labour-market model and contend that immigration 
reduces the economic well-being of residents (Borjas 1995, 1999a, 2003).  The negative effect of 
immigration is hidden, they suggest, because native-born workers respond to the arrival of 
                                                 
1 This summary refers in particular to a series of studies reported by the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER).  See Robert LaLonde and Robert Topel (1991) and Joseph Altonji and David Card (1991).  In 
summarizing the NBER research effort John Abowd and Richard Freeman reported that the “broad implication is 
that immigrants have been absorbed into the American labor market with little adverse effect on natives” (Abowd 
and Freeman, 1991: 22).  A National Research Council Panel convened by the U.S. Commission on Immigration 
Reform reached the same conclusion (Smith and Edmonston 1997: 219-220).  See Card (2005) and Gianmarco 
Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri (2005, 2006) for recent contributions that bolster the conclusion that the impact of 
immigration on the wages of competing native-born workers is small.  
C:\eudora2\attach\Carter Sutch Resident Impacts of Immigration.doc 
Draft of August 3, 2006 
Page 3 of 34 
immigrants by moving elsewhere, “voting with their feet” (Borjas 1999b: 1740).  As Borjas 
explains: 
… natives may respond to the wage impact of immigration on a local labor 
market by moving their labor or capital to other cities.  These factor flows would 
reequilibrate the market.  As a result, a comparison of the economic opportunities 
facing native workers in different cities would show little or no difference 
because, in the end, immigration affected every city, not just the ones that actually 
received immigrants (Borjas 2003: 1338, emphasis in original). 
In this view immigrants “crowd out” native workers who flee to areas less impacted by 
immigration.  Indeed, if every arriving immigrant worker inspired one resident departure, total 
employment in the local market and therefore the wage would remain unchanged.   The 
residents’ departure disperses the immigrants’ wage-depressing effect across the entire economy 
where it is difficult to detect precisely because it is pervasive.  Therefore the question of the 
wage effects of immigration is intimately related to the locational choices of foreign and native 
workers. 
The empirical evidence on this “crowding-out hypothesis” for the modern period is 
mixed and no consensus has been reached.  Investigating data for the 1970s and 1980s, Randall 
Filer (1992), Borjas (2001), and several others find a negative relationship between immigration 
(or net immigration) and out-migration of resident workers.  Research by Michael White and 
Yoshie Imai (1994), Richard Wright, Mark Ellis, and Michael Reibel (1997), David Card (2001), 
and Mary Kritz and Douglas Gurak  (2001) found either no relationship between the entry of 
immigrants and the exit of the native-born or a positive one; that is, they find that both 
immigrants and the native-born moved to the same cities.  Because the question of harm is, in 
Borjas’ words, “at the core of the immigration debate” (Borjas 1999: 62-63), the issues of 
locational adjustment and wage effects remains hotly contested within the economics 
profession.
2  Kritz and Gurak in a review of this debate suggest that the contradictory results 
reported in the literature are a product of different model specifications, the different populations 
                                                 
2 See Roger Lowenstein (2006) for an accessible account of the debate.  
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studied, the different regions, and the different time periods chosen for analysis (Kritz and Gurak 
2001: 134-135).
3   
This chapter introduces a dynamic alternative to the static supply and demand models 
evoked in the debate and attempts a fresh empirical look at the economic consequences of 
immigration.  We pay particular attention to the argument that native-born workers are pushed 
out of labour markets flooded by foreign workers.  Our approach shifts attention away from the 
recent experience to the decades centred on the centennial year 1900.  There are several reasons 
for thinking that an examination of this historical “Age of Mass Migration” may prove helpful in 
clarifying the scientific issues in debate and allaying public fears about contemporary 
immigration.  During that period immigration flows were considerably heavier than they are 
today, especially when compared with the size of the resident population.  If a negative impact of 
immigration is hard to find in modern data, perhaps it will reveal itself during a period of much 
more intense labour market pressure.  If, as we shall report, there is no evidence of a negative 
impact, then this history will support the alternative model and its more benign implications that 
we put forward.  
Most of the economists who argue that there ought to be significant negative impacts of 
immigration have taken a short-run, static point of view and thus have assumed away any 
relationship between immigration, structural changes, and economic growth.  A long-run, 
dynamic, historical analysis – one that emphasizes the positive impact of immigration on 
economic growth – usually concludes that immigration would bring significantly large positive 
benefits to residents.  This is the perspective taken by economic historians and theorists of 
economic growth (Williamson 1982, Greenwood and McDowell 1986, and Carter and Sutch 
1999).  If the objective is to measure the net effect of immigration, not just the partial short-term 
impact, then one needs to take a longer historical perspective and to explicitly include 
immigration’s impact on economic growth.  Before turning attention to the empirical and 
theoretical issues, it is useful to summarize the similarities and differences between immigration 
then and now.  
                                                 
3 Another problem is that some of the findings are driven by two significant outliers: Los Angeles and New York 
City.  Both cities are major ports of entry for new immigrants even today.  
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American Immigration in the Age of Mass Migration 
The several decades before World War I have been called the “Age of Mass Migration.”  With 
the important exception of the Chinese, most of whom were barred from entering the country 
after passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882; America’s door was essentially open to all 
immigrants willing and able to come.
4  It was not until 1917 that the U.S. Congress took 
measures to restrict immigration with literacy requirements and an expanded prohibition of 
Asian immigration.  A few years later, the Quota Law of 1921 imposed numerical restrictions for 
the first time on immigration from non-Western Hemisphere countries and then these quotas 
were reduced in 1924.  The impact was dramatic.  Figure 1 plots net immigration rates (net 
immigration per thousand members of the resident population) for the full range of the country’s 
history.  Net rates which ran in the range of 6 to 8 per thousand in the first 15 years of the 
twentieth century fell below 2 per thousand after enforcement of the 1924 quotas.  The Quota 
System was removed in 1965, replaced by the Preference System, and since then the net 
immigration rate has slowly drifted upward.  In 2005 the rate was 3.5 per thousand, about one 
half the level a century earlier. 
  The net immigration rate can be taken as a measure of the magnitude of the impact of an 
immigration flow on the receiving population.  Since the relative magnitude of immigration was 
greater in the first decade of the twentieth century than in its last decade, the impact on labour 
markets, including the impact on the wages of the resident population, would presumably be 
greater and more easily detected.  To be sure, the characteristics of early-twentieth century 
immigrants were in some ways different from the “new” immigrants of the recent past.  
Furthermore, the structure of the two economies and their factor markets presented distinct 
institutional environments for the new arrivals to confront.  But we argue that on balance these 
differences probably should accentuate the wage adjustments required in the earlier period 
relative to the recent period.   
Immigration during the Age of Mass Migration was dominated by single males of young 
working ages.  Today there are greater proportions of children, the elderly, and others who do 
                                                 
4 There were some health and character restrictions as well.  A brief chronology of U.S. Immigration policy can be 
found in Barde, Carter, and Sutch (2006: Table Ad-C).  
C:\eudora2\attach\Carter Sutch Resident Impacts of Immigration.doc 
Draft of August 3, 2006 
Page 6 of 34 
not immediately join the labour force (Carter and Sutch 1998: 290).  The impact on the labour 
market was, therefore, likely greater than the net immigration rate would suggest since a 
disproportionate fraction of immigrants from that period joined the labour force.  Moreover, the 
age distribution of the resident population was more concentrated at younger ages then is true of 
today’s aging population (Sutch and Carter 2006, Series Aa125-144).  Thus the young adults 
who dominated the immigrant flow at the turn of the twentieth century were more similar in age, 
background skills, and experience to resident workers then than now.  Thus we would expect 
more direct competition between the two groups. 
Two widely-cited studies, one by Claudia Goldin and the other by Timothy Hatton and 
Jeffrey Williamson, conclude that the mass immigrant arrivals during this period exerted strong 
downward pressure on the earnings of resident workers.  But we note that both contributions 
embrace the textbook logic that we are sceptical of.  Goldin reports, “wages were depressed in 
cities having an increase from 1899 to 1909 in the percentage of their populations that was 
foreign born” and “the results are even more supportive of the view that immigration severely 
depressed the wages of less-skilled labor” (Goldin 1994: 252).  Hatton and Williamson conclude 
that “a 1 percent rise in the labor force due to immigration would have reduced the real wage in 
the long run by 0.4 percent … or 0.5 percent”  (Hatton and Williamson 1998: 172).  Hatton and 
Williamson also report that crowding out was a significant phenomenon between 1880 and 1910, 
presumably as natives fled the regions that were attracting the immigrants as the wages in those 
labour markets fell in response to labour market flooding.  Given the large magnitude of the 
immigrant flows, the age and skill mix of the immigrants relative to the existing population, and 
the less-structured character of the American labour market at that time, these conclusions are 
certainly plausible.  But are they correct?  This chapter takes another look. 
Modelling the Impacts of Immigration 
Economic analyses of the consequences of immigration in both contemporary and historical 
settings usually take as their starting point a static model of the labour market.  Using the 
simplest version of this model, they assume labour to be homogenous in its productivity and 
other relevant characteristics so that immigrant and native-born labour are perfect substitutes.   
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Demand for labour is assumed to be a downward-sloping function of the wage.  The labour 
supply curve is assumed to be upward-sloping (or in some expositions to be vertical).   
According to this model, demand is assumed to be unaffected by immigration itself.  
Thus, for example, the analysis ignores the impact of immigrants in increasing demand for final 
products.  It assumes an economy that is closed to trade with other regions so that an inflow of 
immigrants cannot lead to an increase in the production of traded goods or an in- or out-
migration of resident labour.  The increase in labour relative to capital is not allowed to stimulate 
an inflow of capital or the adoption of new production techniques.  We will return to relax these 
restrictive assumptions later.  Our discussion of this simple version is intended, not as a straw 
man, but as a starting point for discussing our analytical framework. 
Figure 2 presents the familiar graphical analysis which we have labelled the “Textbook 
Economy” model.  Before immigration, the labour supply curve is S0.  It establishes an 
equilibrium wage of W0 and a quantity of resident labour hired of R0.  If a flow of immigrant 
workers equal to M arrives, the supply curve for labour is pushed to the right as shown by S1.  
Here it is assumed that the supply of immigrant labour is perfectly inelastic, that is, wages do not 
influence the amount of immigrant labour supplied.  The outward shift of the labour supply curve 
lowers the equilibrium wage to W1, reduces the employment of residents from R0 to R1, and 
increases total employment to R1+M.  The model assumes “full employment,” so the decline in 
resident employment is due to the voluntary withdrawal of labour services by residents unwilling 
to put forth the same effort at the reduced wage. 
Contrary to this formulation, as students of the subject know, however, the presence of 
immigrants is often associated with high, not low wages.  For example, when Friedberg and Hunt 
plot the average wage and salary income of the 30 largest cities in the United States in 1990 
against the fraction of those cities’ population that is foreign-born they find that “cities with 
higher immigrant densities also have higher mean incomes.  The correlation between these two 
variables is 0.37” (Friedberg and Hunt 1995: 31).  In a study of the American economy a century 
earlier, Goldin also found a strong positive relationship between the fraction of a city’s 
population that was foreign-born and the city’s average wage (Goldin 1994: 247).    
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There is another prediction of the simple model that fails the empirical test.  Real wages 
in sectors that employed a large and growing number of immigrants during America’s Age of 
Mass Migration did not fall over time; they rose.  Real wages at the end of the period were 
higher than at the beginning despite the influx of immigrants.
5  Figure 3 displays three real wage 
series for the period; one for manufacturing, one for railroads, and one for lower-skilled labour.  
In 1910, manufacturing employed one-third of the foreign-born men while transportation and 
communications employed another 12 percent (Sutch and Carter, 2006, Series Ad894-896).  We 
have good reason to believe that a disproportionate number of the lower-skilled workers were 
immigrants.
6 
  So what explains the failure of the straightforward predictions of the textbook model to 
accord with the facts?  As we have noted, an explanation offered by some defenders of the 
textbook model is the possibility of native flight or “crowding out.”  This view takes as a starting 
assumption the notion that before the arrival of new immigrants the regional labour markets are 
in a country-wide equilibrium with an identical wage (after adjustments for particular regional 
conditions) prevailing in all markets.  Thus the arrival of immigrants would push the local wage 
below the national level, inducing some residents of the impacted market to move to another 
area.  In doing so, they restore a national equilibrium.  This explanation, which we illustrate in 
Figure 4, is favoured by Hatton and Williamson (1998, Figure 8.4: 166).  They relax the textbook 
assumption that native workers are confined to the local market and postulate as a consequence a 
highly elastic supply of resident labour, indicated here by the supply curve S0.
7  If the local wage 
falls much below the national norm of W0, some local workers would depart seeking higher 
                                                 
5 The simple model assumes one type of labour.  Data reported here are averages across a variety of labour types.  
These averages are affected not only by the wage paid to each category of labour, but also by the relative share of 
the different occupations in the total.  The impact of shifting relative shares on the average is called the 
“composition effect.”   Since immigrants earned lower wages than the native-born, the growth of the immigrant 
share of the labour force would be expected to lower the average wage.  That the average rose despite the negative 
composition effects, means even stronger wage gains for immigrants, natives, or both, than trends in the average 
wage suggest. 
6 The series on lower-skilled labour is the one used by Hatton and Williamson (1998).  The Hatton and Williamson 
wage series was developed by Williamson (1995: Table A1.1).  Williamson’s source for the period in question is 
Paul A. David and Peter Solar (1977).  See Williamson (1995: 176).  In Figure 3 we plot David and Solar’s series 
for lower-skilled workers.  Incidentally, the Williamson series is in error for 1889 and 1890.  
7 Figure 4 is essentially the same as the textbook model in Figure 2, but with a very elastic supply curve of labour 
replacing the rising (or even vertical) curve portrayed in many textbooks.  
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wages elsewhere.  It might be said that they were “crowed out” by the immigrants. On the other 
hand, if the local wage rises above W0, it will attract migrants from other regions.  With a highly 
elastic supply of resident labour, the exogenous arrival of a number of immigrants equal to M 
will shift the labour supply curve to right as indicated by curve S1.  As drawn here, wages fall, 
but by very little.  The impact of immigrant entry is masked by the native flight.  The 
employment of residents falls sharply from R0 to R1.  If every arriving immigrant worker 
inspired one resident departure, the wage and total employment would remain unchanged.   The 
only change would be the replacement of native workers by immigrants.  
Locational Choices of Immigrants and Natives: State-Level Analysis 
Hatton and Williamson direct attention to the possibility of crowding out as depicted in Figure 4.  
They write: 
Local labor market studies almost certainly understate (or miss entirely) the 
economy-wide impact of immigration on wages.  After all, immigration will only 
lower wages in a local labor market insofar as it increases the total supply of 
labor.  If instead there is completely offsetting native emigration, then a rise in the 
immigrant share is consistent with no change in the size of the local labor force 
and no wage effect of immigration compared with other local labor markets in 
which natives relocate.  But wages should fall (perhaps equally, perhaps not) in 
all locations (Hatton and Williamson, 1998: 171, emphasis in the original). 
The most powerful element of Hatton and Williamson’s argument that immigration was harmful 
to resident workers, therefore, is their finding that crowding out was substantial.
8  They estimate 
that, 
… an additional 100 foreign-born in-migrants to these northeastern states 
increased native-born out-migration by 40.  While this is not quite the one-for-one 
Filer found for late-twentieth century America …, it is substantial crowding-out 
nonetheless” (Hatton and Williamson, 1998: 168-169 citing Randall Filer 1992). 
Hatton and Williamson’s conclusions are based on an analysis of data assembled by Hope 
Eldridge and Dorothy Swaine Thomas (1964) from the decennial censuses.  Hatton and 
Williamson focus on the three decades beginning in 1880.  To identify possible crowding out, 
                                                 
8 Hatton and Williamson also directly address the issue of whether immigrants reduce wages nationally (1998: 171-
173).  They adopt an approach that we find unconvincing.  See Carter and Sutch (1999: 332-333) for a discussion of 
our reservations. 
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they begin by comparing regional differences in net native- and foreign-born in-migration rates 
calculated as a share of the native population.  They call attention to three different regional 
patterns:  (1) in the Northeast, low (but non-negligible) rates of native out-migration coupled 
with high rates of foreign in-migration; (2) in the South, high rates of native out-migration 
coupled with very low rates of foreign in-migration; and (3) in the West, large inflows of both 
the native- and the foreign-born.  Hatton and Williamson concede that there was no crowding-
out in the South or the West.  Few immigrants were going to the South, so they could not be the 
reason for native departures.  Both natives and immigrants were going West in large numbers, so 
immigrants do not appear to have thwarted the natives’ westward march.  If crowding out 
occurred, it would have to be in the populous 14 states of the Northeast that were attracting large 
numbers of immigrants while at the same time losing many of their native-born.  It is to states in 
this region that the Hatton-Williamson crowding-out results reported above apply.  Here we 
review their evidence. 
Figure 5 plots for each state the net migration rates of the native- and foreign-born for the 
1890s.
9  The surprise, in seeming contradiction to the conclusions presented by Hatton and 
Williamson, is the positive correlation between native- and foreign-born migration rates. That is, 
states experiencing the largest exoduses of the native born – Vermont, Maine, New Hampshire, 
Michigan, and (hidden just to the upper right of New Hampshire in the diagram) Wisconsin – 
reported very small inflows of foreign-born.  The bubbles for those states are small.  Immigrant 
inflows calculated as annual averages were less than one percent of the resident population.  
While on balance more native-born left these states than entered, crowding-out by foreigners 
does not appear to explain the exodus.  More likely, the native-born left because of the poor state 
of New England agriculture and the attractive agricultural opportunities out West (Barron 1984).  
States with the heaviest inflows of the foreign-born – Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
New York, and New Jersey – on the other hand were also attracting the native-born migrants.   
In Figure 5 we present the same data that Hatton and Williamson use in their analysis.  
How is it that they reached their seemingly opposite conclusion that the arrival of 100 foreigners 
                                                 
9 The data for other decades is qualitatively similar.  The correlation coefficients between native- and foreign-born 
net migrations are 0.64, 0.70, and 0.77 for the decades of the 1880s, 1890s, and 1900s, respectively.  Only 
Wisconsin in the 1880s displayed migration patterns consistent with possible crowding-out.  In that decade an 18.7 
percent immigration rate was associated with an 8.2 percent outflow of the native born.    
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prompted the out-migration of 40 natives?  We can best explain the logic of their argument by 
reference to Figure 6.  Begin with an initial equilibrium wage in, say, the Massachusetts labour 
market of W0 with total employment consisting entirely of resident workers, given by R0.  The 
industrial boom taking place in Massachusetts at the time shifted the demand for labour curve 
out from D0 to D1.  In the absence of immigration, the wage would rise to Wh and resident 
employment would increase to Rh.  But the boom also attracted immigrants to the state.  Suppose 
that M foreign-born workers respond by moving to Massachusetts.  This shifts the supply of 
labour curve out to S1, defines the equilibrium wage to be W1, and reduces resident employment 
to R1.  The “crowding-out” of natives that Hatton and Williamson measure is not a reduction in 
native employment to a level below R0.  Rather it is the difference between the hypothetical 
resident employment increase to Rh and the actual employment R1.  In other words, natives and 
immigrants were both moving to the same dynamic locations.  As they accurately put it, “strong 
labor demand crowding in and foreign-born immigrant crowding out were both at work in this 
case” (1998: 167).  Hatton and Williamson’s measure of a 4 for 10 “immigrant crowding out” 
was actually offset by “labor demand crowding in.”  Natives were crowded out only in the sense 
that their inflow might have been larger still had the immigrants failed to arrive.
10 
We suggest that Hatton and Williamson’s effort to measure a hypothetical crowding out 
separate from the inflows induced by strong labour demand is misleading.  The crowding out that 
is associated with a harmful impact of immigration, by definition, can only occur if wages fall 
below the national average.  But at W1 and R1 wages are higher than in the initial equilibrium 
and native employment is greater. The appropriate question is whether there is a negative 
relationship between foreign immigration and resident migration.  There is not.  The state-level 
data on immigration and native migrant flows do not support the conclusion that immigration 
during this period reduced the wages of residents.   
 
                                                 
10 This definition of crowding out may overstate the case since the model rules out, by assumption, a number of 
processes, described elsewhere in the text, by which immigrant arrivals may increase local wages, thereby 
increasing their attraction to native-born workers.  
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Locational Choices of Immigrants and Natives:  County-Level Analysis  
Earlier we showed that state-level data for the 14 states of the Northeast were characterized by a 
positive correlation between the destinations of resident and foreign-born workers.  While state 
data is better than regional data, even states are too heterogeneous to reveal migration flows 
across labour markets.  New York in 1900, after all, included both big industrial cities and 
thinly-populated rural, agricultural areas.  To focus more directly on the relevant labour markets 
we examine migrant flows at the county level between 1900 and 1910.  These data demonstrate 
that there was no crowding out.  Instead, native and foreign born were migrating to the same 
counties. 
Our county-level data comes from the published returns of the U.S. Censuses for 1900 
and 1910, which reported county-level data on population disaggregated into native (white, 
black, and other races) and the foreign born.  For 1910 we also have these population figures for 
those ten years of age and older.
11  We use these data to calculate a crude measure of net in-
migration of the native and foreign-born into each county.
12 
Figure 7 displays a map of the U.S. that identifies what we call “Immigrant Magnet 
Counties.”  These are the 318 counties that experienced a net increase of 1,000 or more 
immigrants over the decade.  Bubble size is proportional to the numerical increase.  It is clear 
from the figure that immigrants disproportionately settled in the industrial counties of the 
Northeast and Midwest and, to a lesser extent, along the Pacific coast.  In general, the Immigrant 
Magnet Counties are the ones that had already established a strong immigrant presence at the end 
of the nineteenth century.  Some evidence in support of this view is that there is a strong 
                                                 
11 These data are available in machine-readable format for the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social 
Research (Haines 2004). 
 
12 A discussion of the method used to calculate the net migration rates is given in Sutch (1975).   Some county 
boundaries changed between 1900 and 1910, some counties were partitioned to form new counties, and some 
counties changed their name.  We have used the maps in William Thorndale and William Dollarhide (1987) to 
aggregate counties in 1910 in such a way as to produce a contiguous area that closely matched the boundary of a 
1900 (or an appropriate aggregate of 1900 counties).  This procedure produced approximately 2,800 county or 
county-like regions in 47 states or territories and the District of Columbia.  The data set excludes Oklahoma and 
Indian Territories (1900) and the State of Oklahoma (1910).  Because of incomplete enumerations four Indian 
Reservations (Standing Rock, Cheyenne River, Pine Ridge, and Rosebud) all in South Dakota and Williamsburg 
County, Virginia were excluded. Alaska and Hawaii Territories are not included.   
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correlation between the foreign-born population in 1900 and the net foreign in-migration over 
the following decade.
13  Perhaps immigrants’ locational choices had nothing to do with high 
wages but instead were most heavily influenced by the presence of other immigrants, particularly 
their families and friends from the home country who had immigrated earlier. 
Figure 8 helps to clarify the relative role of family and friends verses economic factors 
such as high wages in attracting immigrants in this era.  It displays what we call an Immigration 
Impact Index for each magnet county.   We define this as the increase in the number of foreign-
born between 1900 and 1910 per thousand native-born residents in 1900.  It shows that the 
largest increases in immigrants relative to the native population occurred in counties in the upper 
Midwest, Mountain, and Pacific regions, not those of the industrial northeast. 
  Of the 318 “Immigrant Magnet Counties” depicted in Figure 7, 72 percent experienced a 
positive inflow of both foreign-born immigrants and native in-migrants.  Figure 9 presents a log-
log scatter diagram that plots each of the magnet counties in a manner designed to illustrate the 
relationship between the total net in-migration (native and foreign born) and the net increase in 
the foreign-born population.  The 45-degree line represents the locus of points where the increase 
in the foreign-born and the total in-migration are the same.  Counties plotted above the 45-degree 
line experienced a net in-migration of both the native- and foreign-born.  Counties below the 45-
degree line experienced a net in-migration of foreign-born and an offsetting net out-migration of 
native born.  Perhaps the arrival of the foreign-born prompted the native born to flee by 
depressing wages. 
We can not conduct a formal test of this hypothesis since we do not have county-level 
wage data, but we suggest that the pattern displayed in Figure 9 is not consistent with an 
interpretation that the counties below the line exhibited crowding out.  The sizes of the bubbles 
in the diagram indicate the magnitude of each county’s immigration impact index. Where the 
impact of immigration was the greatest (indicated by large bubbles), we find that both natives 
and immigrants had poured into the county.  In all of the counties below the line, the 
immigration impact index is quite low (the bubble sizes are small).  Only four counties below the 
line had an impact index greater than the average index of those above the line.  These patterns 
                                                 
13 The correlation between the logarithms of the two numbers is 0.79.  
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suggest that the reason for the native outflow from the counties below the line was unlikely to 
have been due to a proportionately heavy foreign-born inflow.  We conclude that the crowding-
out mechanisms did not operate during the Age of Mass Migration in any general way.  Instead, 
natives and immigrants were both moving to the same high-wage regions.  These findings 
suggest that the immigrant arrivals were not reducing the wages of resident workers in this 
period. 
An Alternative Model of Immigration’s Impact 
As we noted, switching the focus to a period a century ago prompts us to adopt a dynamic 
perspective that we believe may resolve the contradiction between the elementary models of 
immigration (including the crowding-out model) advocated by Borjas which predict a decline in 
wages and the empirical studies that find little or no evidence for such an effect.  The simple 
models assume that the only change in a labour market experiencing immigration is the 
exogenous outward shift of the labour supply curve.  This assumption is systematically violated 
in the real world.   It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that it is never the case, because 
immigrant entry not only responds to market conditions; it also positively stimulates market 
change. 
It is impossible to imagine a plausible sequence of events in which immigrant entry 
occurs in isolation of an induced stimulation of demand.  To take only the most obvious 
consequence, the arrival of newcomers will increase the demand for final products.  Immigrants 
have to eat and find shelter and they can be counted on to purchase many other goods and 
services ranging from necessities to indulgences.  But, when immigrants purchase these items, 
output will respond and thus the demand for labour will shift out.  Because the shift in the labour 
supply curve inevitably is accompanied by a shift in the labour demand curve, it is extremely 
difficult to measure a “pure” wage impact of immigration on resident wages holding “other 
things equal.”  The inherent conceptual difficulty of this problem and – we would argue – its 
futility, heightened by the political implications of the results, are what make the issue of 
immigrant impacts so contested.  We suggest that immigration is interesting and important 
precisely because of those features that make measurement of its wage impact within the context 
of the textbook model problematic.    
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In addition to the labour demand shifts that occur pari passu with the arrival of 
immigrants, history suggests that immigrants are generally drawn to localities, occupations, and 
industries experiencing innovation, growth, and evolutionary change.  Economic motives seem 
primary even though migration to join relations, friends, and countrymen influence many.  In 
other words, immigrants do not locate in stagnant textbook labour markets.  Our first suggestion 
then is that immigrants differentially select destinations with high and or growing wages.  The 
reasons why this might be true are easy to understand.  Immigrants have already made the 
decision to leave home; they select their final destinations using economic criteria.  Indeed, 
immigrants’ selection of high wage cities was Goldin’s explanation for the positive correlation 
between the city wage and the foreign born share that she found about 1900 (Goldin 1994: 247).  
A simple expression of this possibility is depicted in Figure 10, which we label the “Dynamic 
Economy” model.  We begin with the assumption that wages in all local labour markets are in 
equilibrium at the intersection of the original demand and original supply curve, the point shown 
by W0 and Ro.  We then let the labour demand curve in a selected city shift outward, perhaps 
reflecting a resource discovery.  As a result, wages in that city might be expected to rise to Wh 
and resident employment to expand to Rh.  However, since immigrants are mobile and attentive 
to economic rewards, they select the city with the dynamic economy over all others.  When they 
do so, they cause the supply of labour curve to shift out (and become more elastic) at wages 
above W0.  In that event, employment expands from R0 to R1+M.  Although the resulting wage 
rate, W1, is below the counterfactual wage Wh, it may nevertheless remain for some time above 
the initial level W0, and therefore above the wage in cities that did not experience the positive 
demand shock.  Resident employment also expands from R0 to R1. 
Figure 10 provides a framework for interpreting Goldin’s finding of a negative wage 
impact.  When she reports, “wages were depressed in cities having an increase … [in their] 
foreign born” (emphasis added), she is referring to the difference between Wh and W1, not to a 
wage below W0.  This subtlety is overlooked in many summaries of Goldin’s contribution.  
Reviews of Goldin reported by Hatton and Williamson (1998: 170), Dolmas and Huffman (2004: 
1129), and Graham (2004: 60) suggest that immigrants depressed wages to a level below W0.  
This was not the case.  Resident wages were high in cities with large numbers of immigrants.   
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  The dynamic economy model assumes a demand shock unrelated to immigration.  A 
second mechanism that would explain the failure of immigration to have a depressing impact on 
wages is an induced demand shift, that is, a shift in demand that responds to the arrival of 
immigrants.  More foreigners or indeed more population from any source by itself should not 
mean lower wages or increased unemployment because the additional people not only supply 
labour but add to the demand for output in a closed economy.  Even if we relax the textbook 
assumption of a closed economy and allow local labour markets to import goods from another 
region to meet the expanding demand, this induced demand story will still be valid.  This is 
because some goods and services must be produced where they are consumed – restaurant meals, 
construction, and educational and medical services.  In addition, an open economy will respond 
to an increase in its labour force by expanding production of tradable commodities in which it 
has a comparative advantage.  Thus an exogenous entry of immigrants that produces an outward 
shift in the labour supply curve will prompt a positive response from the labour demand side of 
the market.  It is also conceivable that, with an open economy, the impact of immigration may 
increase resident wages if the expansion of local industry pursuing a comparative advantage also 
allows those firms to exploit economies of scale (Romer 1996; Brezis and Krugman 1996) or if 
strong complementarities between immigrants and residents are at work (Ottaviano and Peri 
2005). 
This mechanism is depicted in Figure 11, which we label the “Open Economy” model.  
Before the arrival of the immigrants, the market is in equilibrium at W0 and R0.  An exogenous 
inflow of immigrants then shifts the labour supply curve from S0 to S1 temporarily driving the 
wage down to W1.  The relatively low wages attract new firms to the city.  This response shifts 
the labour demand curve from D0 to D1, thereby restoring the wage to its initial level.  Borjas, 
Freeman, and Katz (1997) suggest that these shifts in industrial structure play a quantitatively 
important role in the adjustment of city wages to immigration shocks.  If economies of scale 
exist, then the demand for labour might shift out even further as the region’s firms exploit their 
competitive advantage viz a viz competitors in other regions.  Then wages might rise to W2 and, 
if so, the employment of native residents would increase from R0 to R2.  
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Conclusion 
In this chapter we examine the impacts of immigrants on the wages and employment of resident 
workers during America’s Age of Mass Migration.  In contrast to the widely-held view that 
immigrant wage and employment effects for this period were larger than in the modern period, 
we find no negative effects.  Indeed, we argue that they increased in the presence of heavy 
immigrant inflows. 
We use the same data as other researchers, though we add more highly-disaggregated 
data that strengthens our claims.  Our striking conclusions stem from our modelling and it’s 
critique of the standard economist’s approach.  This standard approach is framed in terms of the 
textbook labour market model that invokes the assumption that immigrants enter otherwise static 
labour markets.  This assumption is known to be false:  immigrants select markets where labour 
demand is growing; their arrival stimulates further labour demand growth.  Yet economists’ 
response is to treat these conditions as technical nuisances that get in the way of precise 
calculations of immigration’s effect as measured by the difference between the prevailing wage 
in some local labour market and the one that would have prevailed in the absence of 
immigration. 
Here we take the opposite approach.  For us, the endogeneity between immigration and 
local labour market conditions is the central question.  During America’s Age of Mass Migration 
we show that immigrants and residents we moving to the same dynamic labour markets.  While 
the arrival of immigrants undoubtedly kept wages in some of these markets from rising even 
faster, residents experienced wage increases in the presence of heavy immigration.  And the fact 
that wages did not rise faster extended the length of the economic boom and was good for 
everyone. 
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Note: Immigrants include both authorized and unauthorized additions to the resident population.  Net immigration 
is the difference between immigration to the United States and emigration from the United States.  This series differs 
from the “official” figures that measure only arrivals and not departures and because an effort is made to indicate the 
year of the immigrants arrival and not the year of their official admission.   
 
Source:  Haines and Sutch 2006 and U.S. Census Bureau 2005.    
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Note: The data for “all manufacturing” are based on the hourly earnings estimates originally developed by Albert 
Rees (1961) and are consider superior to the manufacturing wage data estimated by Paul Douglas (1930).   Douglas’ 
series on the weekly wages of railroad workers were derived from the reports of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission and are considered quite reliable. The series on low-skilled workers is taken from Paul David and Peter 
Solar (1977) but these are in turn based on the estimates published by Whitney Coombs (1926).  Coombs based his 
estimates on the full-time weekly earnings of the lowest paid occupations reported for each industry by the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics.  Since these data exclude most common labourers, the series is labelled “lower-skilled,” though 
Coombs and David and Solar call it “unskilled.”  All three series were deflated by the David-Solar index of the cost 
of living (1860=100) and the resulting estimates of real wages were then converted to a common base where 1900 is 
set equal to 100.  See the source for additional detail and for citations to the original sources. 
 
Source:  Sutch and Carter 2006, Series Ba4314, Ba4316, Ba4218, and Cc2.   
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Figure V. Hatton and Williamson’s Test of Crowding Out 
 
 























Bubble Size is Proportional to the
Magnitude of Foreign Immigration
 
 
Notes:  The rates graphed are the net migrant flows over the decade divided by the average native-born population.  
Thus 0.08 represents an eight-percent inflow over a ten-year period or an average annual migration rate of eight-
tenths of one percent. The state names are indicated by a two-letter code: CT, Connecticut; IL, Illinois; IN, Indiana; 
MA, Massachusetts; ME, Maine; MI, Michigan; NH, New Hampshire; NJ, New Jersey; NY, New York; OH, Ohio; 
PA, Pennsylvania; RI, Rhode Island;  and VT, Vermont.  The plotted point for Wisconsin is the small dot partially 
hidden by the plotted observation for New Hampshire. 
 
Source:  Eldridge and Thomas 1964: Tables A1.11, A1.12, and A1.14.  
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Note: All 318 counties with an increase in the foreign-born population (aged 10 and older in 1910) equal to or 
greater than 1,000 are indicated.  The bubble size is proportionate to the numerical increase in the foreign-born with 
New York and Kings Counties in New York State the largest with increases of 362 and 195 thousand respectively 
followed by Cook County, Illinois (the site of Chicago with 193 thousand), and Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania 
(75 thousand). 
 
Source: Haines 2004 and authors’ calculations.  
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Note: All 318 counties with an increase in the foreign-born population (aged 10 and older in 1910) equal to or 
greater than 1,000 are indicated.  The bubble size is proportionate to the rate of foreign immigration.     
 
Source: Haines 2004 and authors’ calculations..    
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Figure IX. Total Net In-Migration and the Increase in the 
Foreign-Born Population, 1900-1910 
 














Note: All 318 counties with an increase in the foreign-born population (aged 10 and older in 1910) equal to or 
greater than 1,000 are indicated.  The bubble size is proportionate to the rate of foreign immigration.  All counties 
above the straight line experienced both foreign immigration and native in-migration.  Those below experienced 
native departures.   
 
Source: Haines 2004 and authors’ calculations.    
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